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1 - Introduction 
Portugal, despite having a long tradition of municipal intervention in the sat-
isfaction of public needs, experimented a long period of centralism during the 
Estado Novo regime. With the fall of this authoritarian regime, there was a natural 
urge from the population to return to the above referred municipal tradition. Thus, 
since 1974 till nowadays, local governments have been benefiting from an in-
creasing share of public funds to face new responsibilities transferred from cen-
tral government. 
Although the importance of local governments in Portugal did not increase 
dramatically, we can not deny the visibility of local governments (municipalities 
in special) since 1974 and that the trend has been towards greater municipal 
intervention. The municipalities have benefited from a favourable public opinion 
despite the occurrence of cases of corruption. For this result contributes, among 
other reasons, the closeness of political representatives to local voters and the 
concrete problems to be solved at local level. 
If we recognise that municipalities benefit from this favourable public opin-
ion, we also agree that there is a lack of studies on the quality of management 
of local representatives. In this paper we try to answer the referred need by 
analysing the performance of Portuguese municipalities and how it is related with 
electoral results. The measurement of local governments performance is a rath-
er difficult task because there is a lack of data on this subject. The data avail-
able does not cover aspects such as type of services provided, output produced, 
costs related with output produced, etc. We have to rely on indirect indicators of 
quality of management. Therefore, the results obtained in this paper are subject 
to further evidence using more refined indicators of performance of local gov-
ernments. 
This paper is organised in six sections. In a second section, we review 
some of the literature on the performance of local governments. In a third sec-
tion, we evaluate to what degree voters aprove the performance of mayors. For 
that purpose, we derive several indicators of mayor's aproval by voters. Using 
electoral outcomes we compare these measures of electoral aproval with equiv-
alent measures mainly determined by ideology and overall evaluation of the 
mayor's party. In a fourth section, we calculate some indicators of local govern-
ments performance. In a fifth section, we analyse the relative importance of the 
performance indicators as. explanatory variables of electoral results. To that 
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purpose, we use as dependent variable the previously defined measures of elec-
toral aproval. Our main purpose is to bring evidence on the relative importance 
of quality of management indicators compared to other explanatory variables of 
election outcomes. Finally, in the last section we present some conclusions. 
2 - A brief review of literature on the performance of local governments 
In contrast with other research areas in the field of government finance, 
studies analysing the performance of local governments are not abundant, al-
though recently an increasing number of authors show interest for this subject. 
As a consequence of lack of data, the available studies usually provide indirect 
measures of local governments performance. Furthermore, to derive those meas-
ures, the authors have to rely on strong assumptions that may restrict the valid-
ity of the results obtained. We may be able to classify these studies into six 
major research aproaches. In a first aproach, studies provide measures of im-
pact of fiscal policy at local level by analysing its effects on the location of res-
idents. Taking as background the model developed by Tiebout (1956), where 
residents vote with their feet to obtain the best combination of local public goods 
and fiscal burden, several authors analyse the interaction between local fiscal 
policy and population migration (Oates, 1969, and Rothenberg, 1970). Schuler 
(1974) not only analyses the interaction between local governments and loca-
tion of residents but also considers the feedback effect of residents relocation 
on local governments fiscal receipts. Cutherbertson et al. (1979, 1981 a, 1981 b) 
analyse the impact of local governments fiscal policy on urban employment and 
population. 
In a second aproach authors rely on hedonic type estimates to derive meas-
ures of allocative efficiency. Steven Deller (1990) following an early paper by 
Brueckner (1979) assumes that property values are maximised when public goods 
are provided efficiently. Therefore, the author expects that the estimates of the 
coefficients of local public goods will be positive if those local public goods are 
underprovided. Those estimates will have a negative sign if they are overprovid-
ed. If the estimated coefficients are close to zero, this will mean that the public 
good is efficiently provided. 
A similar methodology is followed by Lori L. Taylor (1995). Nevertheless, 
the author admits that differences in the provision of local public goods might 
also have been captured by wages differences. Therefore, the estimates are 
obtained for a single labour market. 
Mathew Khan (1995) also uses an hedonic-type model. The author pre-
dicts that, controlling for productivity, wages will be lower in cities with higher 
attributes. In the model the indirect utility function of residents is defined over 
wages, rents and local public goods. Because the vector of local public goods 
is not observed, the author uses a revealed preference aproach. Provided that 
migration is costless and there is full information, wages will be lower if the vector 
of local public goods bundle is larger. Estimating hedonic functions for wages 
and rents it is possible to predict wages and rents controlling for personal char-
acteristics and housing attributes. Then the author derives an index of city qual-
ity of life. 
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In a third aproach, the authors try to estimate productivity measures and 
efficiency measures. Charles R. Hulten (1984) develops a model that allows the 
estimation of the rate of growth of public sector productivity without an explicit 
measure of sectional output. Consumers maximise utility, considering a private 
commodity and a public commodity that is internally produced, subject to a certain 
technology in the production of the public commodity and a fatal expenditure 
constraint. The public commodity is expressed as a function of an input vector. 
In the study it is considered that the amount of public commodity increases at 
a constant rate in consequence of technological progress and changes in the 
production environment. The inputs considered are capital services, labour, non-
durable intermediate goods and purchased services. With the assumption that 
price of public commodity is a translog function of prices of inputs, and using 
Shepard's duality theorem, the author derives a linear equation that allows the 
estimation of productivity growth in the production of the public commodity. 
Steven C. Deller (1992) evaluates the production efficiency of local gov-
ernments concerning rural road services in USA. A total of five inputs are as-
sumed to be used in the production of rural roads: labour measured by «full 
time employees» and «part-time employees»; capital measured by the flow of 
services from «motorised graders», «single-axe trucks», and «loaders». To es-
timate services of inputs, the author assumes that capital services are inversely 
related to the square root of the age of the equipment. The output is measured 
using an index of different types of rural roads. The production technology is 
assumed to be represented by a log-linear quadratic function. To evaluate pro-
duction efficiency, the author estimates the production function for three groups 
of local governments organised by increasing mileage responsibility. The results 
provide evidence that local governments with lower mileage responsibility are 
less efficient than those with higher mileage responsibility. 
Bruno De Borger and Kristiaan Kerstens (1996) estimate indices of cost 
efficiency using five different reference technologies. To obtain cost frontier es-
timates the authors use as dependent variable local government expenditures 
and as independent variables proxies for local governments outputs, such as 
number of beneficiaries of minimal subsistence grants, number of students en-
listed in local primary schools, surface of public recreational facilities, total pop-
ulation, and the fraction of the population older than 65. The index of cost effi-
ciency is then regressed against explanatory variables such as income, tax price, 
per capita grants, population density, level of education, and two dummy varia-
bles for participation of socialists and liberals in the ruling coalition. 
A fourth aproach evaluates the performance of local governments consid-
ering the response of citizens to the provision of local public goods. Shyam Nath 
e Brijesh C. Purohit (1992) argue that citizens may respond to publicly provided 
local goods in three distinct ways: increasing demand for public local goods; 
suplementing deficient public provided local goods with private suply; substitut-
ing publicly provided local goods by privately provided local goods. These au-
thors derive a model of local fiscal choice introducing the above mentioned re-
sponse of consumers. The utility function of the community is specified as a 
CES function with two types of goods (local public goods and private goods). 
The functional form used considers parameters that represent the allocation of 
the community's income between public goods and private goods, the financing 
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by own resources and other sources of funds, and the distribution between grants 
and borrowing .. The budget constraint is the sum of three types of resources: 
local taxes and fees; grants, borrowing. The estimation of the substitution elas-
ticity between public local goods and private goods, according to the authors, 
will allow to determine in each way how consumers do respond to publicly pro-
vided goods. 
An aproach frequently used to evaluate government performance is to 
observe poll results and election outcomes and to relate them with local gov-
ernment performance. Despite the fact that the majority of studies aim at ex-
plaining the behaviour of voters representatives concerning the distribution of 
public expenditures along their mandate, we use this aproach to derive meas-
ures of local governments aproval by voters. The extension of this type of models 
to analyse local governments behaviour has been introduced by several authors. 
The studies analysing central government results shows that 1/3 of voters inten-
tions depend on the performance of the economy. There remains the doubt about 
the importance of economic evolution on local election results and to what de-
gree its influence depends on which party is represented at central and at local 
level. 
In a less formalised aproach, performance of local governments is evaluat-
ed deriving indicators such as proportion of investments in total local govern-
ment expenditures, degree of budget implementation, and other quality of man-
agement indicators (Dupuis, 1991 ). This aproach is very useful to complement 
empirical evidence produced with the estimation of formalised models. As we 
referred before, the estimated models rely on strong assumptions. Therefore, 
the evidence produced has to be seen only as indirect signs of local govern-
ments performance. 
3 - Electoral aproval of mayor's mandate 
Our study considers the results of the elections held for the Municipal 
Council (Camaras Municipais) in 1989 and in 1993 in Continental Portugal. 
Camaras Municipais are the executive body of the municipalities where repre-
sentatives are elected by the Hondt method (proportional to the outcome of each 
party). The mayor is the first member of the list of the most voted party. In 
Portugal, despite previous discussion for several times, only the parties can run 
the executive body. 
In Continental Portugal we have 275 municipalities, most of them of small 
size (1) if we consider population in 1991: 82 municipalities had less than 
1 0 000 residents; 149 municipalities had a number of residents between 1 0 000 
and 50 000; 23 municipalities had a number of residents between 50 000 and 
100 000. For the interval 100 000-150 000 of residents the number of municipal-
ities is only 12, whereas this number decreases to 9 when we consider a number 
of residents above 150 000. To give a clear picture of the asymmetry existing 
between few municipalities and all the others we present in the figure 1 a graph 
(1) Compared to other countries the area of each municipality is of medium size. 
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of municipal population in 1991 organised by increasing size. As we can see in 
this graph, the size of Lisbon (the largest municipality) and Porto (the second 
largest municipality) is overwhelming, showing clearly that in Portugal municipal-
ities of intermediate size are under-represented. 
FIGURE 1 
Population of municipalities (municipalities organised by increasing size) 
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To derive measures of electoral aproval, as we referred before, we use 
the last two elections for local governments held in 1989 and in 1993 (in the 
end of 1997 a new election is going to be held). We consider two election 
outcomes because we want to measure the aproval of voters both in a static 
and in a dynamic perspective. In a static perspective we measure the voters 
aproval using alternative variables. A first variable is simply the percentage of 
votes of the party most represented in the executive body of municipalities 
(PER93). In a second variable, we compare the result of the party in power 
during the last mandate with a close election result for the European Parliament 
(DIF93). We chose this election because it is not influenced by the so-called 
useful vote which hapens for national parliament decreasing the results of small 
parties and increasing the results of large parties. This comparison is also use-
ful because it allows us to determine to what degree local elections are influ-
enced by ideology and general considerations on the agenda of each party. If 
theoretical expectations on the closeness of voters and representatives are cor-
rect, in the election for local governments, voters are aware of the performance 
of their representatives and, therefore, the difference of election results at local 
level and at National and European level is significant. Furthermore, we would 
expect that this difference would be in average larger for smaller municipalities 
because of closeness of voters and visibility of oportunity costs of local execu-
tives decisions is higher. 
To estimate DIF93 we compare, for the most voted party in the local elec-
tion of 1989, the results obtained in the local election of 1993 with the results 
obtained in the election for the European Parliament in 1994. These two dates 
are sufficiently close for the comparison to be possible. More specifically, we 
calculate the difference of the percentage of votes in the party in each of these 
elections. 
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As we observe in figure 2, the parties most represented in the municipal 
executives, in general, obtain a better result in the local election than in the 
European parliament election. In this figure, we organised the municipalities by 
increasing population size. As we can conclude from the observation of the fig-
ure 2, the amplitude of the differences does not diminish with the size of the 
municipality, not confirming therefore our expectations that election results in 
larger municipality should be more influenced by the general perception about 
the party in the municipal government. 
FIGURE 2 
Difference of percentage of votes 1993 (municipalities organised by increasing size) 











Average differences of election results 
Municipalities 
Population < 1 0 000 ...................................................................................... . 
1 0 000 ~ Pop. < 50 000 ................................................................................. . 
50 000::; Pop.< 100 000 ............................................................................... . 
100 000 ~Pop.< 150 000 ............................................................................. . 
Population <: 150 000 .................................................................................... . 
Source: Elei96es Autarquicas, Atlas Eleitoral, STAPE. 











To aggregate these differences according to municipal size, we sum up 
the positive value of the differences and than we calculate the average value 
(AVEDIF93). As we can see in table 1 the average values are very similar for 
different classes of municipal sizes. This result is confirmed by the correlation 
coefficient between the positive value of the differences and population, which 
is close to zero (0,011 ). Because the positive value of the differences are pos-
itively correlated with the percentage of the party, we derived another measure 
which consisted of dividing the positive value of the differences by the percent-
age of the party in the European parliament election. Then, we calculate the 
average value by classes of municipal size (AVEDIF93*). As we can see in 
table 1, we still have a result that does not confirm our expectations. An alter-
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native way of measuring the aproval of mayors is to consider if they were or 
not reelected (REELECT). In this case we have a dummy variable taking the 
value one if the mayor was re-elected and zero otherwise. This variable does 
not capture small changes of opinion on the mayors that have a comfortable 
majority. It has, however, the advantage to capture cases where the party did 
not like the performance of the incumbent, reason why it did not suport his/her 
candidacy. As we can see in table 2, at local level the number of re-elections is 
important. If we consider that in most of the cases the non re-elected mayors 
did not run for another mandate, the trend in favour of incumbents is even strong-
er. This result may have two explanations. A first one is that performance of 
local governments is in general very well perceived by voters which tend to keep 
the good performers. Another explanation deals with the advantage incumbents 
have in information economies (they are well known by voters) and the possibil-
ity they have to favour voters who vote for them in return. If this second expla-
nation is true, we would expect percentage of re-elections to be smaller in larg-
er municipalities. As we can observe in table 3, only for the very large 
municipalities, we have a smaller percentage of re-elections and in the last elec-
tion the pattern is even reversed with a larger percentage of re-elections in the 
municipalities above 1 00 000 residents. 
TABLE 2 
Re-election of mayors 
1979 1982 1985 1989 1993 
Number of re-elections ........................ 135 189 182 184 165 
Percentage of mayors re-elected ........ 49,1 68,7 66,2 66,9 60,0 
Source: Elei9oes Autarquicas, Atlas Eleitoral, STAPE. 
TABLE 3 
Re-election of mayors by classes of municipalities 
Pop.<10000 
Pop.;;,10000 Pop.;;,SQOOO Pop.;;,1QOOOO 
Pop. ;;, 150 000 
Pop.<50000 Pop. < 100 000 Pop.< 150000 
Number of mayors re-elected ( 1979- 62,9 62,9 62,8 65,0 50,0 
-1993). 
Percentage of mayors re-elected (1993) 63 57 56,5 91,6 66 
- L_ 
Source: Elei9oes Autarquicas, Atlas Eleitoral, ST APE. 
Considering the total number of re-elections in each municipality, we cal-
culated the average number of re-elections by classes of municipalities. As we 
can see in table 4, with the exception of the class 1 00 000-150 000, the aver-
age number of re-elections decreases with the size classes. The correlation coef-
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ticient between number of re-elections and population is negative but of small 
magnitude (- 0,11 ), which allows us to conclude that we have only mild evi-
dence that re-election of mayors is more frequent in smaller municipalities. 
TABLE 4 
Re-elections of mayors by classes of municipalities 
Average 
Municipalities I number 
of re-elections 
Population < 10 000 ················-·--··-····-·····-·····--··-··--···-·······-·····-····-······-··-·-····················--· 3,20 
10 000 s Pop_ <50 000 ····-··--·········-····-·-····-········-····-··-···-···············-··-···-·············-······--··- 3,14 
50 000 s Pop.< 100 000 ·-········-·······-······-····-········--·····-···--······-···-····-··-·························-· 2,95 
100 000 s Pop. < 150 000 ·-···--·······-·--·······-·······--······-·-······--···········--·····-·-···········--···-······ 3,41 
Population:<: 150 000 ········-··--·····--··-·-··-······---··-·-···-··--······--·····-···----·-····-·······-··-···-··-···--··- 2,55 
In a dynamic perspective, we also measure voters aproval of the action of 
the party most represented in the executive body of municipalities using alterna-
tive variables. A first variable is simply the difference of the. percentage of the 
party in the local election of 1993 and 1989 (DIF93-89). A second variable is 
the ratio of the percentages of votes in 1993 and 1989. Both variables capture 
how the voters evaluate the performance of the last mandate, compared to their 
expectations based on previous mandates or on the electoral program of the 
mayor. This second variable, compared to the former, accounts tor the relative 
size of the variation. A third variable is the difference between DIF93 and DIF89, 
which gives an idea of changes in ttie surplus (or the deficit) of votes in local 
elections compared to the elections tor the European parliament between 1989 
and 1993 (to compare the local election of 1989 we used the results of the 
election tor the European parliament in 1990). The overall picture of the dynam-
ics of electoral results shows that in the last mandate (1989-1993) there are 
more electoral losses than gains. An interesting theoretical question is to know 
it the evolution of the economic situation affects or does not affect the eleotoral 
results of local governments. Does it affect the local governments in general or 
only the local governments belonging to the party in the central government? 
The correlation coefficient between DIF93-89 and a dummy variable GOV93 
(taking the value one it mayor is associated with the party in central govern-
ment and zero otherwise) is 0,02. Therefore, it seems that to belong or not to 
belong to the party in the government does not influence the gain or loss of 
votes in local elections. One might argue that in 1993 we are not yet in a clear 
situation of recession, and consequently, we obtain this result Another argu-
ment is that the performance of central government plays a more important role 
tor larger municipalities. To account tor that, we divided the municipalities into 
two groups: less than 1 00 000 residents and more fhan 100 000 residents. Then 
we calculate the correlation coefficient between DIF93-89 and GOV93 tor each 
group of municipalities. The results confirm our expectations. While tor the smaller 
municipalities the correlation coefficient is almost zero (0,0039), tor the larger 
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municipalities it is negative and significantly different from zero (- 0,4739). The 
same result is obtained for the correlation between DIF93-DIF89 and GOV93. 
For the large municipalities the correlation coefficient takes the value - 0,3892 
while for the small and medium size municipalities it takes the value 0,098. 
4 - Indicators of local governments performance 
In this section we calculate several indicators of municipal performance. 
As we referred before, we have to rely on indirect indicators because we do not 
have available direct measures of output for Portuguese municipalities. 
The indicators we use were constructed considering data from municipal 
accounts (contas de gerencia) which are published by the Ministry of Planning 
and Management of Territory. Underlying the estimation of the first indicator is 
the idea that a better performance of municipalities would determine the alloca-
tion of a smaller percentage of current disbursements to compensation of em-
ployees. Provided that the production process is not substantially modified, the 
fall of this percentage can be interpreted as a sign of an increase in the pro-
ductivity of municipal services. 
In order to evaluate more closely what hapened in the mandate 1989-1993, 
we compare the above referred indicator in those two years considering munic-
ipalities organised by size classes. A first conclusion we can derive is that there 
is a fall in the percentage of the compensation of employees, which might be 
interpreted as a sign of increasing productivity. A second conclusion is that there 
is a convergence movement, although small municipalities tend to be slightly 
above the others. These values are average of averages, and consequently there 
is a natural convergence to the mean. So, we present, in figure 3, a graph of 
the percentage of compensation of employees in total current disbursements in 
1993. As we can see in this graph, there is still a considerable dispersion of 
values across similar municipal sizes. As a matter of fact, the correlation coef-
ficient between these two variables takes the values 0,149 and 0,062 respec-
tively in 1989 and in 1993. 
TABLE 5 
Compensation of employees as a percentage of total current expenditures (PCE) 
(average value of percentages) 
Municipalities 
With: 
Population < 1 0 000 ................................................................................ . 
10 000 s: Pop.< 50 000 .......................................................................... . 
50 000 s: Pop. < 100 000 ........................................................................ . 
100 000 s: Pop.< 150 000 ...................................................................... . 
Population <:: 150 000 .............................................................................. . 
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FIGURE 3 
Percentage of compensation of employees in total current disbursements 1993 
(municipalities organised by increasing size) 
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Provided that there is not a tendency for over-expenditure in other current 
expenditure items, it seems that municipalities obtained gains of ·productivity. It 
remains to determine to what degree the decrease in the percentage of remu-
neration of employees was not compensated by an increase in the acquisition 
of services. Because of this doubt, we constructed another indicator which is 
the percentage of compensation of employees plus acquisition· of services in total 
current disbursements 
Considering this indicator, the previous conclusion changes dramatically. 
During the last mandate, it seems there is a strong increase in the percentage 
of acquisition of services, which may be a consequence of the diversification of 
the services provided by the municipality but it may also result from inexistence 
of gains of productivity. Unfortunately-we can not solve this doubt because we 
do not have available indicators of services provided by the municipalities. 
TABLE 6 
Compensation of employees plus acquisition of services as a percentage of total current 
expenditures (PCEAS) (average value of percentages) 
Municipalities 1989 1993 
With: 
Population < 10 000 .................. .................................... .......................... 54,9 70,6 
10 000 s Pop. < 50 000 .................... ...... ......................................... ........ 56,3 71,9 
50 000 s Pop.< 100 000 ......................................................................... 69,1 72,3 
100 000 s Pop.< 150 000 ............................................ ,.......................... 51,1 74,5 
Population;::: 150 000 ..... ~ ............... _ .................... : ..................................... _ 55,6 77,1 
Source: Contas de gerencia dos municipios. 
As an indirect indicator of level of debt, we use the percentage of financial 
costs in the total current disbursements. In Portugal, municipal debt is limited .to 
a certain level determined by the transfers from central government to munici-
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palities. Despite this restriction, the debt of the municipality may be seen as an 
indicator of performance. Municipalities with a debt close to the maximum are 
restricted in their action, and consequently their mayors may be perceived by 
voters as bad performers. It remains to determine to what degree voters have 
a perception on the amount of debt, since this is frequently a matter of discus-
sion between the mayors and the oposition in consequence of lack of informa-
tion about the municipal debt. The general increase in the percentage of finan-
cial costs comes as no surprise. The correlation coefficient between financial 
costs and population of municipalities is - 0,102 in 1989 and - 0,1 09 in 1993. 
As a matter of fact, debt occurs across all types of municipalities. 
TABLE 7 
Financial costs as a percentage of tqtal current expenditures (PFC) 
(average value of percentages) 
Municipalities 
With: 
Population < 1 0 000 ................................................................................ . 
1 0 000 ::;; Pop. < 50 000 ........................................................................... . 
5o ooo :s: Pop.< 1oo ooo ........................................................................ .. 
100 000::;; ~op. < 150 000 ...................................................................... .. 
Population ~ 150 000 ............................................................................. .. 













The per-capita investment (PCAPI) is frequently used as an explanatory 
variable in political business cycle models. ,This choice results from the fact this 
variable is one of the most visible indicators of local government performance. 
We do not want to enter into the discussion if voters are rational forward look-
ing or backward looking and suffering from amnesia, since in the paper we are 
not interested in testing expenditure cycles determined by re-election reasons. 
We use the investment in the last year of the mandates because of practical 
reasons. When we take a dynamic aproach we also compare the per capita 
investment in the last year of the mandate with the last year in the previous 
mandate, which may be only possible if voters do not have memory loss. 
One possi.ble alternative is to use per-capita expenditure. We prefer per-
capita investment because per-capita expenditure is determined by per-capita 
receipts which for most municipalities is practically out of their control. The ca-
pacity to orient public funds to investment is also determined by transfers from 
central government, but municipalities still have some degree of autonomy. As 
we can see, in figure 4, per-capita investment is slightly inverse related with 
municipal size (correlation coefficient is - 0, 17). An alternative indicator to ac-
count for investment is the percentage of investment in total expenditure. Al-
though it is a better indicator of municipal performance, voters do not have a 
good perception of the relative effort the municipality is making in terms of in-
vestment. Consequently, it may not significantly influence voters aproval of the 
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mayor. In the next section we will test the capacity of these two variables to 
explain percentage of votes in the party most represented in the executive body 
of the municipality. 
FIGURE 4 
Per-capita investment in thousands escudos -1993 
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TABLE 8 
Percentage of investment in total expenditures (PINV) 
(average value of percentages) 
Municipalities 1989 
With: 
Population < 1 0 000 ................................................................................ . 46,6 
. 1 0 000 ~ Pop. < 50 000 ........................................................................... . 44,2 
50 000 ~Pop.< 100 000 ......................................................................... . 38,6 
1 00 000 ~ Pop. < 150 000 ....................................................................... . 33,1 
Population <:: 150 000 .............................................................................. . 33,9 







Comparing the last year of the two mandates we conclude that in average, 
there was a decrease in the percentage of investments for all classes of munic-
ipalities with· the exception of the very large municipalities. In relative terms, 
smaller municipalities tend to have larger percentage of investments (correlation 
coefficient between percentage of investment and population is - 0,231 in 1989 
and -0,170 in 1993). 
5 - Performance of local governments and electoral results 
In this section of the paper, our main purpose is to bring evidence on the 
relative importance of quality of management indicators compared to other ex-
planatory variables of election outcomes. A set of other variables are consid-
ered. A first variable is related with ideology. To account for ideology, we use 
the variable PERPE94 representing the electoral result of the mayor's party in 
172 
Esruoos D£ EcoNOMIA, VOL. XVIII, N. 0 2, PRIMAVERA 1998 
the elections for the European parliament in 1994. When we take a dynamic 
perspective we use the variable PERPE94-90 which is the difference of the 
percentage of votes of the party in the election for the European parliament in 
1994 and in 1990. This variable captures how voters evaluate the overall per-
formance of the party. 
A second variable is the dummy variable GOV93 to account for the elec-
toral benefits or costs of the party to be responsible for central government. 
A third variable is PERSON taking the value one if the incumbent is run-
ning for other party and zero otherwise. When the incumbent is running for 
another party, we expect the electoral results to be seriously damaged. 
A fourth variable is REELEI which accounts for the number of re-elections in 
the municipality in the last 5 elections. We use this variable to account for voters 
responsiveness to candidates personal characteristics. If number of re-elections is 
larger that may be interpreted as a case where knowledge of the candidate is 
more relevant to voters than in cases where number of re-elections is lower. 
A fifth variable (only introduced when taking a dynamic perspective) is the 
dummy variable PRO. With this variable we account for the fact that variation in 
the electoral results are influenced by the extinction of this party. 
Another variable is MAJORITY which takes the value one if the party most 
represented in the executive body of the municipality has an absolute majority 
and zero otherwise. Some discussion has been introduced concerning the ben-
efits of the system of proportional representation of parties in this executive body. 
Some authors argue that when the party of the mayor has an absolute majority, 
he is able to carry his program more effectively and consequently his/her per-
formance is better. Disputing this argument, other authors argue that the mayor 
would be less careful with the interests at stake, and consequently his/her per-
formance is worse. Therefore, we may have either a positive sign or a negative 
sign for the estimated coefficient of this variable. 
To account for quality of management indicators, we use the variables 
defined before. When we take a dynamic· perspective we consider differences 
between the value of the variables in 1993 and 1989. For the variable PCAPI 
instead of difference of values we use the ratio between the value in 1993 and 
1989. Because we expect voters in very small municipalities to react differently 
from voters in medium and large municipalities, we allow for a different estimat-
ed coefficient for small. municipalities by considering these variables multiplied 
by a DUMMY variable taking the value one if population is less than 50 000 
and zero otherwise. 
In table 9 we present the OLSQ estimation of an equation where the de-
pendent variable is PER93. According to this estimate, the electoral results at 
local level are strongly influenced by ideology and the overall performance of 
the party most represented in the executive body of the municipality. We also 
find that to betong to the party responsible for central government has hurt in 
the local election. It seems that at local level voters take into consideration 
national issues. 
Our results show that at local level, the personality of mayors is also cru-
cial to explain electoral results. As we can see in table 9 the candidacy of the 
mayor for another party diminishes the percentages of votes in about 4,8%. 
The variable REELEI (number of re-elections) may capture different effects. 
One possible explanation is that some municipalities are more responsive to 
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mayor's personality than others. If so, we should have a positive coefficient for 
REELEI*DUMMY1 where the dummy variable takes the value one if municipal-
ity has a population under 10 000 and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient 
for this variable is, as expected, positive and significant. · 
· The estimated coefficient of the variable MAJORITY is significant and 
positive. In this case, where we have as dependent variable the percentage of 
votes of the mayor's party, an explanation for this result is that having a major-
ity in 1989 is positively associated with a higher percentage of votes in 1993. 
As we will see below, the estimated coefficient of this variable is more mean-
ingful when we take a dynamic perspective. 
Among the variables accounting for local government performance, only the 
variables related to investment (PINV and PCAPI) have the expected sign and 
are statistically significant. According to our results, the investment is translated 
into votes in a greater proportion in the medium and large municipalities than in 
the small municipalities. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients of the variables PCE and 
PCE*DUMMY were expected, but only one is significantly different from zero. It 
seems that in small municipalities to spend in compensation of employees is 
important for the local population, and, therefore, benefits the electoral results. 
TABLE 9 
OLSQ estimations (dependent variable: PER93) 
Estimated T statistics Estimated 
coefficient coefficient 
Constant ................................................... . 24,35 5,07 20,94 
PERPE94 ................................................. . 0,48 8,87 0,48 
GOV93 ..................................................... . - 4,82 -3,89 - 4,75 
PERSON .................................................. . - 9,93 -3,46 - 9,94 
REELEI .................................................... . 0,56 2,68 0,55 
MAJORITY ............................................... . 3,56 3,08 3,55 
PCE93 ...................................................... . - 11,73 -1,20 -13,62 
PCE93*DUMMY ....................................... . 12,89 1,85 18,07 
PFC93 ...................................................... . 12,04 0,31 2,58 
PFC93*DUMMY ....................................... . - 4,22 -0,11 7,95 
PINV93 .................................................... .. 33,15 
PINV93*DUMMY ..................................... .. -30,10 
RCAPI93 .................................................. . 0,38 2,55 
RCAPI93*DUMMY ................................... . - 0,39 -2,57 
R2 = 0,367 I R2 = 0,365 














In table 10, we present the results when we take a dynamic perspective. 
Now the variables PER93-89, PERPE94-90, PCE93-89, PFC93-89 and PINV93-
89 are differences between the two elections (1993 and 1989 for local govern-
ments and 1994 and 1990 for the European parliament). The R squared of the 
estimated equation is lower, as we should expect because we use differences 
between variables. Still the F statistics is high enough to conclude that the re-
gression is statistically significant. 
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The results, once again, confirm the importance of ideology and general 
evaluation of the party in local elections outcomes. According to our results a 
1% change in percentage of votes for the European Parliament is likely to change 
in 0,6% the result of the party in the local election. 
To belong to the party represented in the central government does not apear 
to affect the variation of the percentage at local level. The variable GOV93 is 
statistically insignificant and has not the expected sign. To further elaborate on 
this, we consider the variable GOV93*DUMMY where the dummy variable takes 
the value one if municipalities have population above 100 000 and zero other-
wise. The estimated coefficient is negative but it is not significant. An explana-
tion for our result, taking into account the result of table 9, is that to be in the 
oposition brought electoral benefits in 1989 as well in 1993. Considering that in 
1989 we were in a period of expansion and that in 1993 we were in a period 
of recession, the behaviour of voters seems to be determined by a need to 
balance powers. Another explanation is that voters perceive that mayors in the 
oposition are more active demanding benefits from central government. 
The estimated coefficient of PERSON has the expected sign and is signif-
icant. The candidacy of the mayor for another party diminishes the percentage 
of votes in 8 %. REELEI shows again as significant and with the correct sign. 
An interesting result is related with the variable MAJORITY. According to our 
estimates, the parties that were in the majority in the executive body of the 
municipality had a loss of about 3,5 %. It seems that to be in the majority is not 
important to perform well. On the contrary, it may lead to the adoption of hasty 
and ill-considered measures. 
The variables related to investment, once again, have the expected signs 
and are significant. In accordance with other studies, voters perceive the per-
formance of local governments through investment but are unable to evaluate 
other quality of management indicators. 
TABLE 10 
OLSQ estimations (dependent variable: PER93-89) 
Estimated T statistics Estimated 
coefficient coefficient 
Constant ................................................... . - 1,65 -1,19 - 0,82 
PERPE94-90 ............................................ . 0,60 7,09 0,62 
GOV93 ..................................................... . 0,33 0,33 0,27 
PERSON .................................................. . - 7,85 -3,12 - 8,10 
REELEI .................................................... . 0,34 1,86 0,33 
PAD .......................................................... . 0,10 0,03 - 1,26 
MAJORITY ............................................... . - 3,42 -3,53 - 3,40 
PCE-89 ..................................................... . 11,94 0,62 - 7,78 
PCE93-89*DUMMY .................................. . - 3,86 -0,19 15,31 
PFC93-89 ................................................. . - 7,84 -0,36 - 3,07 
PFC93*DUMMY ....................................... . 20,92 0,86 14,68 
PINV93-89 ................................................ . 34,9 
PINV93-89*DUMMY ................................. . -35,64 
RCAPI93/89 .................... : ........................ . 1,32 2,00 
RCAPI93/89*DUMMY .............................. . - 1,10 -1,93 
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6 - Conclusions 
Our main goal in this paper is to determine if voters in local elections 
account for quality of management of municipalities. The empirical evidence 
shows that voters are able to evaluate municipal councils using observable in-
formation. In this available information, investment seems to be a relevant var-
iable. In very small municipalities the capacity to create employment in munici-
pal services also seems to be significant. Other quality of management indicators, 
usually unavailable or difficult to be perceived, apear to be non-significant. 
Personality of mayors is a very important explanatory variable of electoral 
results in municipal elections, although in our study we just have indirect signs 
of this relevance. 
Our results show consistently that the general perception on the parties 
influence the electoral outcome at local level. A change of 1 % in the percent-
age of votes in the party in the election for the European Parliament generates 
a change in the local election of about 0,6 %. 
Finally, we have clear indications that to be represented in central govern-
ment hurts in local elections. One possible explanation is the traditional behav-
iour of voters who prefer to avoid concentration of power in one party. Another 
explanation is the perception by voters that mayors belonging to the oposition 
are more effective in defending their local interests. 
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